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By Arthur W. Wright
Elsewhere, in this issue, Stan McMillen focuses
mainly on the “macroeconomic” impacts—jobs 
created and income generated—of the University of
Connecticut.  But a major research university also
has “microeconomic” effects that are not easily 
captured by conventional economic-impact models.
Creating “human capital” and “knowledge” are 
the most important such effects. 
The University of Connecticut is a publicly-sup-
ported major research university.  A johnny-come-
lately to the chase for national and global academ-
ic reputation, UConn transformed itself from the
Storrs Agricultural High School (1881), to the
Storrs Agricultural College (1893), the “Conn.
Aggie” College (1899), then Connecticut State col-
lege (1933), and finally into the University of
Connecticut (1940), when it first granted graduate
degrees (first Ph.D., 1949).  After World War II,
administrators followed Clark Kerr’s “multiversity”
blueprint by adding schools of education, business,
home economics, and the like.  Today UConn
is a “Category I. Doctoral
Institution” in the Chronicle of
Higher Education’s reputation
derby, and a “Research
University I” in the so-called
Carnegie Classification used by
the College Entrance
Examination Board.
Yet to many Nutmeggers,
the University’s prime role is
to educate the daughters and
sons of state residents.  Why go
to all the trouble and expense to seek covet-
ed “doctoral” or “research I” status, if your
main function is to turn out bachelor’s degree
holders?  And why pay for much of it out of the
State’s General Fund?
People:  UConn is One Way To Skin the Cat
To economists, human capital (as distinct from
raw labor) is comprised of the general and specific
skills, or knowhow, embodied in workers, whether
it be intricate mathematics used to study the ori-
gins of the universe, or basic social habits like
showing up at the same time every workday.
There are myriad ways to acquire human capital:
choosing the right parents, learning to read and
write, selling Girl Scout cookies, playing a sport—
and of course deferring income in late adolescence
to go to college.
American higher education is anything but a
monolith, of course.  The choices are legion.
Public or private?  Level and scope of instruction?
Terminal degree? Location, price, institutional repu-
tation, student peers?  UConn offers bachelor’s
degrees, with no associate’s degree consolation
prize, in a plethora of different fields.  There’s less
structure and hand-holding than at smaller
schools.  Compared with private universities, there
is a wider spread of aptitude among one’s peers,
less grade inflation, and better value for the (State-
subsidized) tuition money.  At Storrs, students may
have to seek out “honors” work to avoid a straight
textbook diet of learning.  But such an option is
not even available at some other schools.
Why spend all that taxpayer money subsidizing
UConn students?  Couldn’t Connecticut kids go to
Yale or Wesleyan, or UCal-Berkeley or Michigan-
Ann Arbor, instead and get comparable educations?
Yes, of course—provided they could afford the
tuitions and travel costs, and persuade their par-
ents to allow them to be so far from home.  Until
the 1960s, most northeastern states in fact followed
the “New Jersey plan” and exported their high
school graduates—those who could not get into a
Princeton—instead of paying for the large, pub-
licly-supported universities that states in other
regions of the U.S. had supported for decades.
Even today, according to Federal data for 1998,
only 49-60% of college freshmen enter public insti-
tutions in New England, compared with a U.S.
average of 74%.
Two related factors led officials, and voters, in
the Northeast to change their minds about pub-
licly-supported universities beginning in the
1960s.  First was the perception that uni-
versity-level training was increasing-
ly essential to career success in
many fields.  Second, business
firms were seeking more universi-
ty-trained workers.  And there was
evidence that graduates tended to
remain in the same region
where they went to school.
Thus, the New Jerseys and
Connecticuts were missing a bet
by sending so many of their
high-school graduates out of state.
Data on UConn graduates (from the
Alumni Association) bear out the last point.  Of
the nearly 150,000 alumni still alive in 2000, fully
56.3% live in Connecticut, and another 7.6% in
Massachusetts.  Adding Rhode Island, New York,
New Jersey gives a cumulative total of 75% (if we
remove Florida, with its retirees, from the sample).
What about recruiting students from other states,
as the University is currently doing?  Legislators
and voters question it, because the aliens compete
for “subsidized” UConn places with in-state kids.
But Connecticut firms get to pick from a richer pool
of workers—and the University can beef up its
“tuition fund” financing with the higher out-of-state
tuitions.  Besides, while on average the State subsi-
dizes the University, at the margin it costs less than
the out-of-state tuition—$13,506 in 2001-02, triple
the in-state rate—to enroll an out-of-state student.
We mustn’t lose sight of labor market fundamen-
tals.  (1) Graduates of Connecticut colleges and
universities won’t stay in the state if their jobs dry
up.  During the Great Recession of 1989-1994,
skilled workers, laid off, packed up their cars and
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headed west or south, where there were jobs, in
droves.  (2) By the same token, educated workers
of any stripe will come to Connecticut if the state’s
economy is creating new jobs requiring their skills.
So the tendency of BA or BS graduates to locate
nearby is only that—a tendency that makes it easi-
er, at the margin, for state employers to find and
hire upper-end workers.
Research at UConn: Chicken or Egg?
The University of Connecticut’s undergraduate
programs are booming—graduating nearly 3,000
new BA and BS holders a year, attracting more of
the state’s best high school students, and enrolling
growing numbers of non-Nutmeggers.  But UConn
is also pushing research, rewarding faculty and
departments that gain professional recognition,
nationally and worldwide, at the expense of them
who only stand and teach.
Why go so off-message when your undergradu-
ate programs are doing so well?  Indeed, why
endanger your undergraduate successes?  Doesn’t
the push towards research compete with under-
graduate teaching and simply drive up costs?
UConn’s undergraduate programs may have
come first, chronologically, but one can make a
case that they should no longer get first priority
over research in today’s economy.  Instead of mak-
ing undergraduate instruction more expensive,
research should be regarded as the primary task of
the University, one that enhances its BA and BS
programs—and indeed lowers costs through out-
side grant and contract revenues that, in FY 2001,
exceeded $125 million.
There are good reasons to train at least some
undergraduates, the higher-achievers, in a rese-
arch-rich environment.  Researchers as teachers
are more willing to challenge the conventional wis-
dom; indeed they’re trying to change it through
their research.  More important, vigorous faculty
research, to which state citizens have a claim
because they’re footing much of the bill, gives
Connecticut table stakes for the vast international
research game.  New knowledge is becoming ever
more esoteric and arcane—and crucial to thinking
about and solving problems encountered in busi-
ness, and in government as well.  Supporting a
cutting-edge research capability means being able
to attend a seminar, or to phone a researcher
about a problem, or to hire a known-quantity grad-
uate student for the summer or perhaps perma-
nently once the degree is awarded.  Thus, even if
UConn were to abandon its BA/BS production, the
State of Connecticut would still have reason to
invest taxpayers’ money in the research capacity of
the University.
Note that I’ve made my case here without men-
tioning the benefits of new knowledge actually cre-
ated at UConn.  Most such benefits will not be
limited to those who underwrite the research;
another part of the ante in the high-stakes interna-
tional knowledge game is subjecting one’s findings
to professional scrutiny from around the world.
The last thing Connecticut would want to do with
the research it is paying for at the University of
Connecticut is to try to embargo the results!
By Steven P. Lanza
For the U.S. and for Connecticut, the 1990s expansion was a period of low 
inflation, low unemployment and strong economic growth.  Even in this past 
recession, Connecticut’s unemployment rate clung to historic lows, while the 
U.S. rate held to about 6%—a number more common in recent expansions than 
in recessions.  And all the while, inflation remained subdued.  How has the 
economy managed such a feat?
An October 2001 study in the St. Louis Fed’s Regional Economist suggests that,
for the U.S. economy overall, the answer may lie in two important productivity-
enhancing economic developments—a maturing workforce and new technology
at the workplace.  
Granted, what’s true for the nation isn’t necessarily true for each state, but
similar forces may help explain the relative performance of state economies over
the decade.  Consider Connecticut’s experience.  Throughout the 1990s,
Connecticut boasted low unemployment and a high measure of technological
innovation.  It also had the oldest and one of the best-educated labor forces of
any state.  And education, as it turns out, is a key to explaining differences
across states.
The Experience
Economic conditions weren’t always as auspicious as today.  During the 1970s,
the unemployment rate climbed mercilessly, across the nation and around the
state, doubling inside of ten years.  Meanwhile, inflation raged, topping 13.5% in
1980.  Then, in 1982, U.S. unemployment changed course, dropping from a high
of 10% to an eventual 1999 low of 4%.  Connecticut’s jobless rate, even in the
Great Recession, remained at or below comparable U.S. figures.  And inflation
virtually dropped off the radar screen.
As stagflation rose in the 1970s, the labor force grew greener and technological
change (measured by patent activity) slowed.  Baby-boomers flooded the labor
market, giving the workforce an air of youth.   And between 1971 and 1979,
patents dropped 46% both in Connecticut and in the U.S.  Then, as stagflation
receded, these trends also reversed.  The labor force began to act its age as the
share of young workers, aged 16 to 24, declined.  And the ’80s and ’90s brought
a rising tide of technology.  Patents doubled in Connecticut and tripled in the
U.S.
The Theory
What’s the connection between lower unemployment rates, older workers and
new technology?  Young workers frequently move into and out of the labor force
to attend school or build families.  They jump from job to job seeking to match
work requirements with their skills and interests.  So, the younger the workforce,
the higher the equilibrium unemployment rate.  Morever, older workers have
developed on-the-job skills that reduce their motivation to look for other jobs
and make employers want to keep them.
The effects of technological change are similar, though to some extent offset-
ting.  New technology allows producers to supply the same level of output using
Older, Wiser, and Better Schooled Than Ever
Changes in the 1990s: More Experience, More Training
Source: Developed by The Connecticut Economy based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the U.S. Patent Office, and Economy.com.